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One of the signi ficant advances in 
economic theory has been the incorporation of 
uncertainty into the models used to investi­
gate economic behavior. The explicit treat­
ment of uncertainty has permitted economists 
to predict the behavior of economic agents 
operating in an uncertain environment and to 
explain, for example, the existence of insur­
ance, stock markets, and forward exchange 
markets that have no necessary role in a 
deterministic world. One natural application 
of the economics of uncertainty has been to 
the study of international trade and exchange 
in which uncertainty regarding exchange 
rates and relative prices is a prominent 
feature of the environment of economic 
agents. The purpose of this paper is to frame 
the international trade results developed in 
the recent works of Wolfgang Mayer and 
Raveendra Batra in light of the current state 
of the theory of the firm under uncertainty. 
Be fore analyzing the effect of uncertainty on 
international trade, a perspective on the appli­
cation of the economics of uncertainty to 
neoclassical theory will be presented with an 
emphasis on the theory of the firm. 
One class of models into which uncertainty 
has been incorporated can be labeled as 
"entrepreneurial" models in which the firm is 
assumed to maximize the expected utility of 
pro fit.1 The results from these models indi­
cate, for example, that production decisions 
depend on the preferences and expectations of 
the entrepreneur and thus that the results of 
deterministic theory do not in general obtain. 
The question that remains, however, is 
whether these models are appropriate only for 
a firm owned by an entrepreneur or if they 
pertain to firms that are owned by more than 
one individual. 
*Graduate School of Management, Northwestern 
University, and California Institute of Technology, 
respectively. 
'See Baron for an early survey of this class of model 
and Hayne Leland for a further contribution. 
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A second class of models assumes that 
markets exist such that contracts either can 
be traded contingent on each state of nature 
or such that there are as many securities as 
there are states.2 The principal result of these
"complete market" models is that consumers 
have sufficient opportunities to trade so that 
marginal rates of substitution are equated 
across states. In this case, the owners of the 
firm are unanimous in preferring that the 
firm maximize its market value using the 
established market prices to evaluate alterna­
tive production plans, and hence, the results 
of deterministic models obtain. When mar­
kets, however, are incomplete in the sense 
that there are more states than there are 
securities that can be traded, value maximiza­
tion may not be in the best interests of the 
owners of a firm. Furthermore, the owners 
may not agree on an objective for a firm, since 
in an incomplete market consumers' marginal 
rates of substitution cannot be equated 
through their opportunities to trade. 
A third class of models that deals with 
these issues was initiated by Peter Diamond's 
study of a model with an incomplete market 
structure in which the only opportunity 
consumers have to allocate risks is by trading 
the shares of firms in a securities market. 
Even though consumers are unable to equate 
their marginal rates of substitution in each 
state, they do equate their marginal rates of 
substitution between every pair of securities. 
Then, assume that the vectors (across states) 
of marginal returns from a production plan of 
a firm are contained in the subspace spanned 
by the return vectors of firms. Satisfaction of 
this spanning condition permits use of the 
marginal rates of substitution between securi­
ties to demonstrate that shareholders unani·· 
mously prefer that the firm maximize its 
market value. Applying this theory to a model 
2See Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu for the 
principal results for this class of model. 
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in which the firm is privately held but its 
securities are publicly traded, the usual 
results of deterministic theory are obtained 
with a securities market established certainty­
equivalent used in place of the market prices 
that would be present in a complete market. 
A complication in the use of these market 
models involves the separation of ownership 
from control. This separation raises the possi­
bility that managers may believe that they are 
better in formed than shareholders and may 
use their own judgements in evaluating alter­
native production plans. The incomplete 
market model to be considered here will be 
analyzed first under the assumption that the 
managers of a firm act in the best interests of 
the firm's shareholders, and then under the 
assumption that managers use their own or 
some chosen preferences and expectations in 
directing the firm. 
Batra and Sandwip Das have considered an 
entrepreneurial model of a firm engaged in 
international trade, in which the firm maxi­
mizes the expected utility of pro fit in the 
presence of technological uncertainty. They 
conclude that risk aversion invalidates both 
the Heckscher-Ohlin and Rybczynski theo­
rems. Mayer has analyzed an entrepreneurial 
model in which final commodity prices are 
uncertain. He demonstrated that with repre­
sentative identical firms and free and costless 
entry, the Rybczynski and the Stolper­
Samuelson theorems hold if the theorems are 
restated in terms of a "change in expected 
price, with higher central moments constant" 
(p. 797). He also concludes that the Factor­
Price Equalization theorem obtains if the 
"utility functions and probability assessments 
of a given industry's firms are identical in 
both countries" (p. 804). These results are not 
contradictory in the context of entrepreneur­
ial models, since Batra's model pertains to 
the "intermediate run," in Mayer's terminol­
ogy, while Mayer considers an industry in 
long-run equilibrium. 3 
Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin 
(1976a,b; 1978) have shown in the context of 
an incomplete market model that the opportu­
nity to trade the shares of firms in a securities 
3See Murray Kemp for concise statements of the 
theorems of international trade. 
market is sufficient to yield all of the standard 
results of international trade. The model to be 
considered here will be analyzed both in the 
context of an incomplete securities market 
and of an extension of the entrepreneurial 
class of models. In the incomplete market 
model the firm will be assumed to act in the 
best interest of its shareholders, and share­
holders will be shown to unanimously prefer 
that the firm acts to maximize its market 
value. Batra and Mayer assume, however, 
that the firm maximizes the expected utility 
of pro fit for some utility function and expec­
tations, and find that in the intermediate run 
the behavior of the firm depends on the 
chosen utility function and expectations. The 
analogous assumption within the context of 
the model considered here is that because of 
the separation of ownership from control, the 
manager of the firm uses some chosen prefer­
ences and expectations to guide the firm. The 
second assumption under which the model 
will be analyzed is thus that the "manager 
cum entrepreneur" maximizes the expected 
utility of the total residual pro fits that accrue 
to shareholders after the purchase of treasury 
shares for an arbitrary strictly concave utility 
function and arbitrary expectations. The 
result in this case is that the firm will be 
operated in exactly the same manner as if it 
were operated directly in the best interests of 
shareholders. Furthermore, under either as­
sumption the market equilibrium has the 
same properties as in a deterministic model, 
and all the standard theorems of international 
trade hold. Consequently, the re formulated 
entr;epreneurial model leads to the same 
behavior as does the incomplete market 
model. 
I. The Model 
To examine the Batra and Mayer models, 
consider a two-sector model in which a firm in 
sector 1 is characterized by a technology 
utilizing factor inputs K1 and L1 of capital and
labor, respectively, to produce an uncertain 
output X1 of commodity 1 given by
X1 = aF1 (K1, L1) 
where F1 is a production function and a is a
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random variable, a 2'.: 0. The output X2 of
commodity 2 produced by a firm in the second 
sector is deterministic and given by 
X2 = Fi(Ki. Li) 
Each sector is assumed to be composed of 
many firms, although only one firm in each 
sector will be designated and analyzed. The 
production functions F 1  and F2 are assumed to
be linear homogeneous and strictly concave so 
that 
i = 1, 2
where ki is the capital-labor ratio, f � > 0 andf [' < 0. The firms make their input decisions
prior to observing a and are assumed to sell
their output at the price determined in a 
perfectly competitive market. Letting the 
price of the output of the first sector 
expressed in terms of the second commodity 
be denoted by p, 4 the pro fit of a firm in sector
1 is 
1l" 1 = pa L1f1 (k1) - wL1 - rK1 
where wand rare the factor prices which are 
assumed to be determined in a competitive 
market. 
Each firm's input decisions are made at the 
beginning of the period, a is then observed,
and at the end of the period firms distribute 
their pro fits to their owners who then 
purchase commodities under certainty. Let­
ting ui ( c;' c�) denote consumer i's ordinal
utility function for consumption of the two 
commodities at the end of the period, his 
consumption problem is to choose (C\, C�) 
given his income t(a0) 
to maximize V ( C\, CD
c�. c� 
subject to pC\ + C� ,s /i(a0) 
where a0 is a realization of a. The ordinary
demand functions will be denoted by 
C\(Ii(a0), p) and C�(/i(a0), p). Since at the
end of the period when consumption decisions 
4Batra uses p to denote the relative price of commodity 
2 in terms of commodity 1. The alternative definition is 
used here because, as will be indicated, the price will be a 
random variable, and we wish to place all the uncertainty 
in the first sector. 
are made the supplies of the two commodities 
are fixed at X1 and X2, the equilibrium price
p(a0) is determined by the solution to the
market-clearing conditions 
L C\ (Ii (ao), p(ao)) = X1 
i 
Consequently, if the output of the first sector 
is uncertain, the relative price must be uncer­
tain as indicated by Helpman and Razin 
(1976a). Batra assumed that the output price 
is constant when supply is uncertain but such 
an assumption is unwarranted. Furthermore, 
as will be demonstrated below, an uncertain 
price does not affect the standard results of 
international trade. Mayer considered an 
uncertain price assuming that it is determined 
"internationally." 
The solution to the consumer's end-of­
period consumption problem determines his 
indirect utility function denoted by 
Ui (Ii (a), p(a)) which the consumer will use
in making port folio decisions. The uncertain 
price appears both as an argument of the 
utility function and as a determinant of 
income Ii (a), since the pro fit of firms depends
on that price. The indirect utility function is 
assumed to be strictly concave in Ii(a), indi­
cating risk aversion, and will be used to 
characterize the consumer's investment be­
havior. 
A consumer i is assumed to be endowed 
with fixed quantities of labor Li and capital Ki 
that can be sold ?o any firm at prices wand r, 
respectively. A consumer is also endowed with 
cash. ? and an ownership share in firm j
denoted by ::Y J, where �i::Y J = 1, j = 1, 2.Consumers may sell their initial ownership 
shares or can purchase new shares 'YJ in a
securities market, which at the beginning of 
the period establishes the market values Vi 
and Vi of the two firms. The income Ii(a) 
available for consumption is obtained from 
savings y i, 5 from the sale of labor and capital,
and from share ownership which entitles the 
consumer to a share of pro fits or 
li(a) = ')'\1l" 1 + ')'�1!" 2 + y i  + wLi + rKi 
5The interest rate is assumed to be zero. A positive 
interest rate will not alter the results. 
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Consumers are assumed to have expecta­
tions regarding pa that are expressed as a
distribution function G;(p, a), and expecta­
tions are assumed to be independent of the 
allocations made at the beginning of the 
period. That is, consumers and firms are 
small enough that their actions are not 
perceived to affect the relative commodity 
price. 
At the beginning of the period the 
consumer has the portfolio problem 
to maximize E;  U; (t{a), p(a)) 
'Y11, 'Yi. Y1 
subject to y; + 'Y; Vi + )'�Vi s ? + ;y ;  Vi 
+ ;yi V2 
where ;y\ Vi + ;y� V2 is the value of the initial
endowment of shares and ('Yi Vi + 'Y� V2) is
the cost of purchasing the new portfolio. 
Solving the budget constraint for savings / 
and substituting into t(a), the portfolio opti­
mality conditions are 
E;[U; · (1ri - Vi)] = E;[U'; · 
(paLifi(ki) - wLi - rLiki - Vi)] = 0
E;[u;  · (1r2 - V2)] � E;[U\] · 
(Lif2(k2) - wL2 - rL2k2 - V2) � 0
where u; denotes aU/at(a). Dividing the
optimality conditions by I u; . dG;(pa) and
de fining the consumer's implicit price as 
p;(p, a)� U'i 
· i(p, a)/(f U\ · dG;(p, a)) 
where g; (p, a) is the density function corre­
sponding to G;, the optimality conditions can
be rewritten as 
(1) (f /(p, a)(pa)dpda)Lifi (ki)
- wLi - rL1ki Vi 
(2) Lif2(k2) - wL2 - rL2k2 � V2 
Since fp;(p, a)dpda � l, fVip;(p, a)dpda 
� Vi and similarly for the other terms that do 
not depend on the realization of the random 
variables panda. The implicit price/ (p0, a0) 
is the amount consumer i would pay for a
security that pays one dollar if and only if 
(p0, a0) obtains, 6 or equivalently, the mar-
6The securities market is incomplete in this model, 
because there are more states than there are securities. 
Consequently, the implicit price /(p, a) for consumer i 
may differ from the implicit price p1(p, a) for consumer 
ginal rate of substitution between a dollar if 
(p0, a0) obtains and a dollar obtained with
certainty. A security such as cash that pays 
one dollar for any (p, a) outcome thus has a
value of one dollar. A securities market equi­
librium is assumed to exist. 
The securities market ensures that the 
quantity I /(p, a)padpda will be the same
for all consumers, since solving from ( 1)
yields 
(3) J p;(p, a)padpda � 
(Vi + wL1 + rLiki)/(Lifi(ki)) 
The right-hand side is independent of i, so 
I /(p, a)padpda is the same for all i. This
quantity may be interpreted as the market 
price for a unit of "certain" production 
Li Ji (ki ), since the numerator is the payment
to factor inputs plus the rent Vi to owners and 
the denominator is the certainty portion of 
output. Since the term in (3) is the value of a 
unit of certain output Li f, (ki ), it will be
called the market certainty-equivalent price 
and will be denoted by p*. 
Suppose that there are two countries each 
having firms in both sectors. In the presence 
of an international securities market the 
consumer's portfolio problem remains un­
changed except for the fact that the owner­
ship shares which may be purchased may now 
be distinguished by country. A representative 
firm in each sector may still be designated 
and, from (1) and (2), it can be seen that the 
opportunity for consumers to trade in shares 
in both countries enables the market mecha­
nism to operate so as to equate the marginal 
rates of substitution for securities among 
consumers in both countries, and thus the 
market certainty-equivalent p* is the same
for firms in these countries.7
H. Firm Input Decisions 
In order to determine the optimal inputs, it 
is necessary to specify an appropriate crite­
rion for the firm. Batra and Mayer assume 
j. If the markets were complete, the implicit prices for 
every consumer would be equal, since each would be able 
to make trades contingent on every state (p, a) . 
7 As is customary in models such as these, it is assumed 
that there is no exchange rate uncertainty. 
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that the firm acts so as to maximize the 
expected utility of pro fit for some chosen 
utility function and expectations. Such an 
assumption is clearly warranted if the prefer­
ences are those of an entrepreneur who is the 
sole owner of the firm, but most firms are 
owned by shareholders and not by a single 
entrepreneur. Investor-owned firms are in 
principle to be operated in the best interests of 
their shareholders, but the separation of 
ownership from control suggests that the 
managers of firms may base their decision on 
their own preferences or on preferences that 
the manager believes are appropriate for his 
shareholders. Both the case in which the firm 
is operated in the interests of shareholders 
and the case in which the manager chooses 
some speci fic preferences to represent his or 
the shareholders' preferences will be consid­
ered. Given competitive behavior, the input 
decisions in both cases will be shown to be the 
same and to be functions only of prices 
observable in the markets. This is in contrast 
to the results of Batra and Mayer in which the 
optimal inputs depend on the preferences and 
expectations used. 
A. The Shareholder Interests Criterion 
With this criterion firms are assumed to act 
in the best interests of their shareholders. To 
determine a shareholder's preferences for the 
level of a firm's inputs, consider variations in 
consumer i's expected utility evaluated at a 
securities market equilibrium. Differentiating 
the expected utility evaluated at the optimal 
port folio i'\, -y�, and pi yields
aE;U; . . 
(4) � = -y; [ (f p'(p, a)padpda) 
(5) 
L f'(k ) L]  (-; Ai ) av \I I I - r I + 'YI - 'YI -ka I 
aE;fji . . iJL: = -y; [ (f p'(p, a)padpda) 
f ) k ] (-; Ai ) av \Jl(k1 - r I.- W + 'YI - 'YI aL1
where avUaL, and av\/ak, are i's forecast
of the ch�nge in the market value of the firm 
and aE;U;/ak1 = (aE;U;/ak1)/(EU\) and
similarly for L1• Since the consumer knows
that a securities market equilibrium will be 
established for any level of inputs contem­
plated, the forecasts may be determined by 
differentiating (1) to obtain 
a/(p, a) 
(6) (J ak, 
padpda)L1fi(k1)
+ (f /(p, a)padpda)Li fi(k1) 
(7) 
av\ 
- rk1 - w = -aL , 
As is usual in models in which there is an 
incomplete set of markets for risk sharing, 
each consumer will in general perceive a 
change in his implicit prices as given in the 
first term of (6) and (7). If however, changes 
in the inputs of one firm have a negligible 
effect on the availability of inputs of other 
firms and all consumers perceive that the 
pro fit and market value of a firm is indepen­
dent of the decisions of any other firm, the 
change in the certainty-equivalent price can 
be shown to be zero. Since there are many 
firms in each industry, consumer i's forecast 
of the change in the market value of another 
firm in the first industry will be zero, which 
implies that 
J a/(p, a) padpda = ap* = 0 ak, ak, 
J a/(p, a) padpda = ap* = 0 aL1 aL1 
Thus each consumer may perceive a change 
in his implicit prices but this variation is 
constrained, since he acts as a price taker with 
respect to the market certainty-equivalent 
price p*. This is analogous to the usual pure
competition assumption. 
With this result (6) and (7) may be substi­
tuted into (4) and (5) to obtain
aEiui . av ; 
(8) � = ::Y'1 ak,
' 
= ::Y\((f /(p, a)padpda)Li fi(k1) - rL1) 
= ::Y\(p* Li fi(k,) - rL1) 
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aEiui - ; av;(9) 
�= 'Yi aL1
= ;y\((j/(p, a)padpda)J;(k1) - w - rk1) 
= ;y\(p* /1(k1) - w - rk1) 
All consumers who are initial shareholders 
(;y\ > 0) will thus be unanimous with respect
to a change in k1 and L1 , since they each use
the market certainty equivalent p* given in
(3) and thus the right sides of (8) and (9) 
depend only on shareholder characteristics 
through their ownership share.8
The factor input levels unanimously pre­
ferred by all initial shareholders may be 
determined from (8) and (9) and satisfy
(10) p* f�(k1) - r = 0 
(11) p* /1(k1) - rk1 - w = 0 
For the firm in sector 2 the analogous
conditions are 
(12) /i(k2) - r = 0 
(13) /2(k2) - rk2 - w = 0 
An equilibrium in the factor markets requires 
that the factor rewards be the same for both 
firms, 
(14) p* f�(k1) = f�(k2) 
(15) p* f1(k1) - ki f�(k1))
= !2 (k2) - kzf �(k2 ) 
and that resources are fully employed: 
(16) K = 2:: K; = L1k1 + L2k2 
i 
An equilibrium is assumed to exist such that 
positive amounts of both commodities are 
produced. 
The conditions in (10) and (11) are identi­
cal to those for a firm in a deterministic world 
8The same result obtains if each firm faces a "firm­
specific" technological risk, since the vector of returns for 
a production plan of a firm is a multiplicative factor of 
the return vector for any other production plan. When the 
profit of a firm is not linear in the random variables, a 
market certainty equivalent cannot be determined as in 
(3). 
and do not depend on the characteristics of 
any consumer. This results because the secu­
rities market allows all consumers to make 
trades until the marginal return p* for a
dollar of investment per unit of certain output 
is the same. Furthermore, the equilibrium 
market value of the firm is zero, since 
multiplying (11) by L1 yields
(18) 0 = p* J;(k1) - w - k1r 
= p*Li f1(k1) - wL1 - rL1k1 = Vi 
This is the same result as in the deterministic 
case for a competitive firm with a linear 
homogeneous production function. 
The above demonstration indicates that 
Batra's intermediate-run case and Mayer's 
long-run equilibrium are identical for inves­
tor-owned firms in the sense that a competi­
tive firm with a linear homogeneous pro­
duction function has a zero market value. The 
opportunity for consumers to allocate their 
risks in a security market provides firms with 
the needed in formation p* to plan their inputs
efficiently, and constant returns to scale 
ensure that no firm may earn an excess return 
and thus that the market value is zero. 
B. A Managerial Model 
Separation of ownership from control of a 
firm suggests that managers may not wish to 
or may not be able to determine how the firm 
can be operated in the best interests of its 
shareholders. The manager then may choose 
some representative utility function and 
expectations to use in decision making. Since 
one alternative open to any firm is to purchase 
its own shares and hold them as treasury 
shares, the manager will be assumed in this 
"manager cum entrepreneur" model to maxi­
mize the expected utility of the net (after 
payment for treasury shares) cash flow per 
share that accrues to the outstanding shares. 
Viewing the payment for treasury shares as a 
cost, this is equivalent to maximizing the 
expected utility of earnings per share. Letting 
'Yr denote the percentage of the shares
purchased by the firm and held in its treasury, 
the cash flow per share is 'lrr = (7r1 -
'YrVi)/(1 - ')'r). If the manager employs a
concave utility function U*(7rf} and expecta-
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tions denoted by the distribution function 
G*(p, a), the first-order conditions for 'Yt. L1, 
and k1 are
{19) E*[U*' 
• 
(-Vi{l - 'Yf> + 11"1 - 'YtVi)] 
= E*[U*' · (7r1 - Vi)] = 0 
(20) E* [U*' 
· 
(pafi (k1) - w - rk1)] = 0 
(21) E* [U*' · (paLi fi (k1) - rL1)] = 0 
where the market value of the firm is assumed 
to be unaffected by the firm's share 
purchases.9 The manager's (or firm's) impli­
cit prices p*(p, a) may be de fined as
p*(p, a) = 
U*' • g*(p, a)J(f U*' • dG*(p, a)) 
and the manager's certainty equivalent is seen 
to be the same as that given in (3). Dividing
(19), (20), and (21) by E*U*' and substitut­
ing from (19) gives the conditions in (10) and
(11), so the managerial model yields the same
results as the model in the previous section. 
The difference between the results of this 
model and that of Batra is that here the firm 
may purchase treasury shares, and this 
requires the manager to utilize the same 
market certainty-equivalent used by all share­
holders. Consequently, the manager chooses 
the same levels of inputs as those that result 
from acting directly in the best interests of 
shareholders. Trading in the securities market 
allows the manager to align his marginal rate 
of substitution with that of all consumers, and 
hence, the optimal inputs depend only on 
market observable prices. Batra does not 
permit the manager to trade in a securities 
market, and thus, the optimal levels of k1 and
L1 depend on the manager's preferences and
expectations. 
III. The Theorems of International Trade 
Batra and Das conclude that when firms 
maximize their expected utility of pro fit the 
Heckscher-Ohlin and the Rybczynski theo­
rems do not obtain. Mayer finds that these 
9The initial shareholders are indifferent to the 
purchase of the treasury shares, since the firm pays the 
market price. In this formulation the treasury shares are 
not utilized except to alter the cash flow per share to the 
remaining shareholders. 
theorems hold when he assumes that entry is 
free and that all firms are identical, but he 
concludes that the Factor-Price Equalization 
theorem does not hold because " factor returns 
are crucially dependent on the utility func­
tions and probability assessments of firms" 
(p. 803). When the shares of firms may be
traded in a securities market, the factor 
returns depend only on the market observ­
able certainty-equivalent as indicated in 
(10)-(13). The purpose of this section is to
brie fly indicate that the standard theorems of 
international trade obtain in this case. 
The first step in the development is to show 
that there is a one-to-one relationship 
between the labor-capital factor-price ratio 
w = w/r and the commodity-price ratio. From
(10), {11), (12), and (13) the factor-price
ratio is 
(22) w = f; (k;)/f; (k;) - k;, i = 1, 2 
Differentiation yields 
(23) dw -f['(k;)f; (k;) dk; 
= (f; (k;))
2 
> 
0 
which is the desired result. The factor rewards 
condition in (14) can be differentiated to
obtain 
(24) 
�: 
fi(k1) + p*ff (k1) �� 
so 
(25) 
=ff(k2) 
dk2 
dw 
dp* 
/p* =
ff dk2 - ff 
dk1
dw f� dw Ji dw 
(substituting from (14)) 
= - !�+
Ji 
f 2 Ii 
(substituting from (23)) 
1 1
= - + --w .+ k1 w + k1 
(substituting from (22)) 
With the usual factor-intensity assumption 
it is evident that an increase in the factor­
price ratio results in an increase in the market 
certainty-equivalent price p* if the second
good is more capital intensive than the 
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first. In contrast to Batra's result this holds 
for any strictly concave utility functions for 
consumers or for the managers in an entrepre­
neurial model and not just for the class of 
utility functions exhibiting decreasing abso­
lute risk aversion as he finds. In contrast to 
Mayer's analysis the market certainty-equiv­
alent is not stated in terms of a "change in 
expected price, with higher central moments 
constant" but instead is based on values that 
are readily observable in the securities 
market. 
In a nonstochastic model, the Rybczynski 
theorem states that with a constant relative 
commodity price and inelastic factor supplies 
an increase in the supply of a factor increases 
the output of the commodity that uses that 
factor more intensively and reduces the 
output of the other commodity. Under uncer­
tainty this theorem must be examined with a 
constant relative certainty-equivalent price, 
since as shown earlier, the presence of an 
international stock market guarantees that p* 
will be the same in all countries. To analyze 
the effect of a change in the supply of K, it is
first necessary to consider how the uncertain 
output of the first sector is to be treated. The 
output Xi is given by Xi = cxLifi (ki ), so that
an increase in (L1 J; (k1)) due to an increase in
K will result in an increase or decrease in
actual output for any realization of a. The 
analysis will thus be made for the certainty 
portionxr= Lifi(ki) of output (and for X2 =
Lif2(k2)).io Differentiation yields
(26) axr 
_ 1, (k ) 
aki r aLi 
aK - Li i 1 aK + 1 i aK
(27) ax2 = L f'(k ) ak2 r aL2 aK 2 2 2 aK+12 aK 
To determine the derivatives on the right sides 
of (26) and (27), totally differentiate {16), 
{17), (14), and (15), and set dL = 0 
( = dLi + dL2) to obtain the following system
of equations 
16Batra analyzes a change in the ex post output. 
The determinant D of the coefficient matrix is
D = -p* JUf(k2 - ki)2 < 0, and the
solutions to the equations are 
dL1 = _ dL2 = 2_ * f"f"(k _ k )dK dK DP i 2 2 i 
k1 - ki 
dki dk2 
- = - =0 
dK dK 
Evaluating the conditions in (26) and (27) 
yields 
(28) axi Ji - = -aK k1 - ki 
(29) ax2 !2 aK k1 - k1 
If the first sector is more capital intensive 
than the second (k1 > k2), then axif aK > 0 
and aXif aK < 0 which establishes the Ryb­
czynski theorem. Technological and price 
uncertainty do not affect this basic result 
because the opportunity to trade in a securi­
ties market is sufficient to yield an observable 
market certainty-equivalent that may be used 
to plan input levels. 
Batra and Das find, in contrast, that the 
Rybczynski theorem does not obtain because 
the relationship between the factor-price ratio 
and the commodity-price ratio depends in 
their model on the endowments in the econ­
omy. Mayer reaches a similar conclusion in 
his analysis of the intermediate run. In the 
model considered here the relationships given 
in (28) and (29) are independent of endow­
ments, and, consequently, firms are able to 
plan their inputs using only in formation avail­
able in the securities and factor markets. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem follows 
directly from the Rybczynski theorem when 
the consumption patterns are identical in two 
countries, so a country exports the commodity 
that uses the more abundant factor more 
intensively. Also, the proof of the Stolper­
Samuelson theorem is directly analogous to 
the proof in the certainty case. Differentiating 
{18) and the analogous condition for sector 2 
yields 
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Solving gives 
(30) 
and 
ar -!1 
ap* = k1 - k1
aw ki/1 
ap* = k1 - k1
Comparing (30) to (28) establishes the reci­
procity theorem that 
axl ar 
-
= -aK ap* 
Similarly, 
axl aw- - -
aL ap* 
Converting (30) to elasticities and using (11) 
yields 
dlogr p* !1 
dlogp* = - -; (k2 - k1
) 
w + rk1 
r(k2 - k1) 
dlogw 
= 
p* k2 
( !
1 ) dlogp* w k2 - k1 
ki(w + rk1) 
w(k2 - k1) 
ki(w + k1) 
w(k2 - k1) 
Consequently, if capital is used more inten­
sively in sector 1 (k1 > k2), the real reward to
capital increases with an increase in the 
relative certainty-equivalent price of the first 
commodity while the real reward to labor 
decreases. This establishes the Stopler-Sam­
uelson theorem. 
With irreversible factor intensities the 
factor-price equalization theorem will also 
hold as long as consumers in both countries 
can trade in the same securities and commod­
ity markets. This is in contrast to Mayer's 
conclusion that the factor-price equalization 
theorem does not hold unless all "utility 
functions and probability assessments of a 
given industry's firms are identical in both 
countries" (p. 804). 
IV. Conclusions 
Although technological uncertainty will 
result in price uncertainty, the existence of an 
international securities market is sufficient to 
yield the standard theorems of international 
trade, since the opportunity to allocate risks 
in a securities market permits consumers to 
equate their marginal rates of substitution 
between shares and savings so as to establish a 
market certainty-equivalent that the firm 
may use to plan its inputs. By using the 
information implicit in stock market data in 
making their decisions, the firm will operate 
in the stockholders' interest, even when 
ownership is divorced from management. The 
key to this analysis is the existence of the 
market certainty-equivalent for the uncertain 
factors in the model. Given this and competi­
tive behavior, the theorems of international 
trade result as in a deterministic model. 
When a market does not exist in which the 
certainty-equivalent can be established, the 
standard results will not in general obtain. 
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